Speaking to The Economist, America’s former secretary of state and national security adviser laid out his concerns about the risks of great power conflict and offered solutions for how to avoid it. Read the transcript of the conversation in full here
As my life evolved, I started writing about this issue. And I think when I entered government, I was still leaning to the position of achieving stability through strategic superiority. As I became obliged to study the military capabilities that were being produced and I reached a position in which my recommendation would be part of a final decision to go to war, I asked myself increasingly how one could ever [have] a stable system based on mutual assured destruction.
The cold war was a strategic situation in which we started in an inherently stronger position. But the word “stronger” needs understanding, because the dilemma was—and remains—that countries like Vietnam could defeat a superpower that had nuclear superiority, but did not wish to use it. And that imbalance applied also to[strategy], which perceived Russian conventional superiority, and which in turn enabled Russia to exert a dominant influence.
Now the situation is that China is developing genuine [strategic] capabilities, plus an economy that is competitive, to some extent, with the United States. So, we’re in the classic pre-World War One situation where neither side has much margin of political concession and in which any disturbance of the equilibrium can lead to catastrophic consequences. In that situation [it] gets inherently worse on a technological side.
We thought—and when I say we, I mean that Nixon had his view firmly in his own mind separately from me. I hadn’t met Nixon until he appointed me. Indeed, I opposed him publicly. On that second visit, we decided to prepare a communiqué. The Chinese proposed that each side state their own objectives, their own goals, and not pretend that we agreed after 25 years—by osmosis—on everything. So we listed a lot of disagreements, including on Taiwan.
That may not be possible here. I’m not opposed to that. But I don’t believe that climate change will, by itself, create huge confidence - although I wish Kerry well.
To do what I believe needs to be done—and something towards which the administration is tacking—it’s very close to what I’m describing. The only problem is, you can’t just say it, you have to do it. And you have to do it with a series of intangibles. Because there is no certain answer. You know, in 1938, at the time of Munich, it was not an implausible argument to say that, if you thought you were going to get into conflict with Germany, you better yield – i.e. appease, than go to war then.
So, the current leaders will have to be strong and, beyond that, understand that they cannot use the limits of this. And so, what are the limitations that you can achieve either by agreement, or by practice, or indirectly? So, that’s my general view of Russia. I have never met a Russian leader who said anything good about China. And I’ve never met a Chinese leader who said anything good about Russia, they are sort of treated with contempt. And even when Putin is in China, he is not shown the kind of courtesies that they showed to Macron, [who] came to a special place that is tied to the history of the Chinese leader, and they don’t do that for the Russians.
Henry Kissinger: I would say a Russian and Chinese aim is to constrain [American] freedom of action. And in the Middle East, an American policy that had the elements that I mentioned before would complicate Russia operating in the Middle East; but at least we would attempt to put it into a joint effort so that it’s not an anti-American effort.
So, what could they work together on? India a little bit, through the Russian arms sales. The Middle East? It’s not a natural alliance. Because really, if you’ve been to China, what do people look to Russia for? Anything?Contempt, yes, is the basic attitude. And it’s not wise for us to say we want to split them from China— but it’s something which we should have in mind. And the prerequisite for it is, first of all, not to destroy Russia totally in the war.
So the division in America became absolute, with the realists and so-called idealists on opposite sides. But the people who got us into the war and who sent 550,000 troops, they weren’t realists; they were the idealists who believed an absolute victory was possible. There is a point I made in an article that I published after I was already appointedBut as you say, now, both sides have a concern about China, both the realist and the idealist, for different reasons.
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